The periodic scarcity of water in the Indus River System (IRS) gives rise to inter-provincial disputes especially between Punjab and Sindh which is the lower riparian of this system . Before proceeding further it is important to explain in common language certain technical terms used in case of flow, quantity and storage of water for irrigation and hydel power generation. The basic unit to measure the flow of water is 'cusec' which means a quantity of one cubic foot of water flowing in one second or commonly 6.24 gallons or 28 litres of clean water per second. The quantity of water is measured in terms of acre foot which equals the quantity of water needed to flood one acre of level ground to a depth of one Foot. This means 43560 cubic feet or 271,814 gallons or 1,223,165 litres of water. For very large quantities of water the term million acre feet (MAF) is used which equals a million or ten lakhs acre feet . In case of hydel-power, one cusec of water dropped from a height of 100 feet possesses gross potential energy to generate approximately 8.5 KW of electrical power and the amount of electricity produced is directly proportional to the height from which the same quantity of water is dropped. In the case of food production one acre foot of water applied to ordinarily levelled ground without any special inputs will produce 45 maunds of wheat. One cusec of water flowing continuously for 24 hours equals 1.98 acre foot of water.
These terms have been explained in order to enable ordinary readers to appreciate the potential that nature has hidden in the natural annual flow of water of a river both in terms of irrigation as well as hydel power. The flow of water in any river varies greatly from season to season and also from year to year. For this reason daily flows are recorded and tabled over a long period of time on weekly, monthly and annual basis . For the principle rivers of Indus River System , these records are available for seventy five years indicating maximum as well as minimum flows during different seasons. The rivers of this system are Indus itself and its tributaries Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Bias and Sutlej. Since river Kabul merges with Indus at Attock ahead of classic Indus plains, therefore, the Indus River System is counted to comprise Indus below Attock and its tributaries the five rivers of Punjab.
There is one thing that must be very clearly understood. Allah Almighty holds into His exclusive discretion the quantity of water that flows into rivers at any time. Human ingenuity may make any device for storage and diversion of river flows but the sum total of the quantity shall always remain the same as Allah Almighty allows into the rivers. The construction of storage (dam) and diversion (barrage) schemes , therefore, solely depends on the total quantity of water that is available in a river during a year, particularly how these flows dovetail into the quantity of water needed during crop seasons. This is the reason that has necessitated recording of river flows for long period of years. On the basis of over fifty years' record the mean flow in Indus River System (IRS) totalled 175 MAF on the eve of Partition of Punjab in 1947. This comprised 93 including 27 of Kabul for Indus, 23 for Jhelum, 26 for Chenab, 6 for Ravi, 13 for Bias and 14 for Sutlej in MAF annually. Out of this 175 MAF, 167 flowed into Pakistan at the time the boundaries of partitioned Punjab were fixed according to the Radcliffe Award . This means that the Indian East Punjab drew only 8 MAF of a total of 33 MAF of water that annually flowed in three eastern rivers Ravi , Bias and Sutlej before waters of these rivers entered West Punjab of Pakistan. Under the Internationally agreed rights of lower riparians and also Indian Independence Act 194 , the balance 25 MAF waters of three eastern rivers were to be shared between India and Pakistan and India was also to guarantee non-interference in the existing supplies of canal waters flowing into Pakistan from Head Works (Madhopur and Ferozpur) in India. The sordid tale must first be told as to how this life blood of Pakistan's agriculture was sold out to India first through the criminal conduct of Punjab Government in 1947 and later the infamous Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 which deprived Pakistan nearly one-sixth of its total surface water resources. This sell out is indeed a bigger act of treason against Pakistan than the separation of East Pakistan connived by 'patriots' .
Under Independence Act a Punjab Partition Council was set up comprising equal members from both East and West Punjab governments . An Arbitral Tribunal, with life up to March 31, 1948, was also set up to finally decide upon any contentious issues between the two governments. Committee B of the Partition Council was to decide upon the share of the three eastern rivers between the two governments and the canal waters. It was agreed between the representative of two governments that existing supplies of canal waters will not be disturbed and that the river waters shall be shared 'proportionally'. Under this formula the Rau Commission of 1941 had awarded East Punjab area of undivided Punjab construction of Bhakra Dam with a storage capacity of 4 MAF on river Sutlej. Both sides had, therefore, agreed to Pakistan's share of 21 MAF of three Eastern rivers and non-interference of supplies of waters of canals flowing into Pakistan from Madhopur and Ferozpur Head Works. The West Punjab government of Khan Mamdot with Daultana and Shaukat Hayat as key members, however, failed to draw out an agreement to this effect and register it with the Partition Council and relied only on the verbal assurances of their lingual brothers of East Punjab.
Consequently , as soon as the Arbitral Tribunal was abolished, India turned off the tap on canal waters on April 1, 1948 and on Pakistan's protest denied any agreement and claimed all waters of canals and eastern rivers to it. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali then Secretary General of Pakistan writes on the episode that on the part of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. On the part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency and lack of common prudence which had disastrous effects on Pakistan. In May 1948 a delegation led by Ghulam Muhammad with Daultana and Shaukat Hayat as members went to Delhi to sort out the issue. On May 4,1948 Ghulam Muhammad signed a statement which said that apart from the question of law involved, the governments were anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit. The East Punjab government would progressively diminish its supplies to Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals in West Punjab to give it reasonable time to tap alternative sources. The legally agreed right of Pakistan to the waters of three Eastern rivers and the canals flowing into it from India, was thus abjectley surrendered by the delegation which went to discuss the problem with Indians.
When news of this reached Karachi, Liaquat Ali Khan in a telegram to Nehru immediately disowned the 'statement' as signed under duress and also informed UNO not to register it as an expression of government of Pakistan since the dying Jinnah was still alive. It should be remembered that the canal waters flowing into Pakistan from India irrigated less than ten percent of the total irrigated area in then West Punjab and contributed little to overall agricultural output. The Ghulam Muhammad Delegation, however, laid the basis for India to claim all the waters of Eastern rivers to which India stuck during all negotiations between the two countries. Pakistan persistently refused such claims until India finally assembled 90 percent of its army on West Punjab borders to brow beat Pakistan into submission. It was at this time that Liaquat challenged India for a fight to finish although the first Pakistani Commander-In-Chief of Army advised against war. Unable to confront a nation aroused to fight to finish, India withdrew its army and the canal supplies continued to flow.
It was at this juncture that Chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority in United States described the canal water dispute as 'Punjab powder keg' and went on to say that with such 'inflammables' around there is no chance of peace in the sub-continent. This made World Bank President, Eugene Black, contact the two governments in September 1951 and made India agree to Liaquat's demand that until a just solution is found the existing arrangement of water supplies to Pakistan shall not be disturbed. However, no sooner the 'hurdle' of Liaquat was removed in October 1951, India started throttling the canal waters which the post Liaquat factional governments were not able to confront on 'principle', eventually ending in the anti-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Indians, perhaps, waited for the assassination of Liaquat to squeeze Pakistan on canal waters much the same way as they waited till the death of Quaid-e-Azam to occupy Hyderabad in blatant disregard of its own Stand Still Agreement.
No comments:
Post a Comment